Ledyard, John

Combined from CaltechAUTHORS

• Anufriev, Mikhail and Arifovic, Jasmina, et el. (2022) The role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model; Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; Vol. 141; Art. No. 104387; 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104387
• Asparouhova, Elena and Bossaerts, Peter, et el. (2020) Price Formation in Multiple, Simultaneous Continuous Double Auctions, with Implications for Asset Pricing; 10.7907/h8b1v-76536
• Oliveira, Angela C. M. and Salmon, Timothy C., et el. (2020) Introduction to the Symposium on Research on Social Dilemmas; Economic Inquiry; Vol. 58; No. 1; 9-11; 10.1111/ecin.12824
• Ledyard, John O. (2019) Design of Tradable Permit Programs under Imprecise Measurement; 10.7907/a6fvp-ke472
• Arifovic, Jasmina and Ledyard, John O. (2018) Learning to alternate; Experimental Economics; Vol. 21; No. 3; 692-721; 10.1007/s10683-018-9568-1
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information; 10.7907/qk8yn-ng985
• Groves, Theodore and Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods; 10.7907/8q2dx-kpv75
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis; 10.7907/ck8tg-pc937
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium; 10.7907/nz1n2-wkn56
• Easley, David and Ledyard, John O. (2017) Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions; 10.7907/hwega-5cv60
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Economics of Space Station; 10.7907/65nfx-ytv91
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) Market Failure; 10.7907/rjxey-cy967
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources; 10.7907/68k2y-nze20
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) Incentive Compatibility; 10.7907/k0pn8-m1r25
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources; 10.7907/mhs8g-89z20
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections; 10.7907/96gx6-bw273
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research; 10.7907/f3s6c-3pw50
• Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results; 10.7907/dja9h-egh71
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing; 10.7907/y75p1-g1790
• Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly, Kristin E. (2017) Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights; 10.7907/zvw0j-4sc93
• Dudek, R. and Kim, Taesung, et el. (2017) First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms; 10.7907/rgkfq-awr86
• Bykowsky, Mark. M and Cull, Robert J., et el. (2017) Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem; 10.7907/r2944-rm514
• Ledyard, John O. and Noussair, Charles N., et el. (2017) The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization; 10.7907/sb8p2-77f71
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem; 10.7907/y319s-0vv88
• Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David, et el. (2017) The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous Items; 10.7907/6ehr5-jww49
• Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (2017) Repeated Implementation; 10.7907/b7sbx-5k980
• DeMartini, Christine and Kwasnica, Anthony M., et el. (2017) A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions; 10.7907/wve8f-fxz97
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes; 10.7907/v811f-scj07
• Ledyard, John O. and Olson, Mark A., et el. (2017) The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services; 10.7907/1xbgs-71j14
• Bossaerts, Peter and Fine, Leslie, et el. (2017) Inducing Liquidity in Thin Financial Markets through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms; 10.7907/yk4m6-yrv98
• Ishikida, Takashi and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's RECLAIM Emissions Market; 10.7907/txk4w-c9032
• Ledyard, John O. (2017) Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs; 10.7907/74cgh-0j750
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments; 10.7907/fwfvf-9g770
• Fine, Leslie and Goeree, Jacob K., et el. (2017) ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism; 10.7907/mte8a-n4r44
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms; 10.7907/x8d9n-q6988
• Plott, Charles R. and Carlson, Dale, et el. (2014) An Analysis of the Information and Reporting Requirements, Market Architectures, Operational and Regulatory Issues, and Derivative Instruments for RECLAIM
• Carlson, Dale and Forman, Charles, et el. (2014) An Analysis and Recommendation for the Terms of the RECLAIM Trading Credit
• Berliant, Marcus and Ledyard, John O. (2014) Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 16; No. 2; 196-221; 10.1111/jpet.12061
• Bossaerts, Peter and Frydman, Cary, et el. (2014) The Speed of Information Revelation and Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing Two Theories; Review of Finance; Vol. 18; No. 1; 1-22; 10.1093/rof/rfs049
• Anufriev, Mikhail and Arifovic, Jasmina, et el. (2013) Efficiency of continuous double auctions under individual evolutionary learning with full or limited information; Journal of Evolutionary Economics; Vol. 23; No. 3; 539-573; 10.1007/s00191-011-0230-8
• Arifovic, Jasmina and Ledyard, John (2012) Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 96; No. 9-10; 808-823; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.013
• Arifovic, Jasmina and Ledyard, John (2012) Individual evolutionary learning with many agents; Knowledge Engineering Review; Vol. 27; No. 2; 239-254; 10.1017/S026988891200015X
• Healy, Paul J. and Linardi, Sera, et el. (2010) Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders; Management Science; Vol. 56; No. 11; 1977-1996; 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1226
• Krajbich, Ian and Camerer, Colin, et el. (2009) Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Free-Rider Problem; Science; Vol. 326; No. 5952; 596-599; 10.1126/science.1177302
• Ledyard, John (2009) Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 13; No. 1-2; 1-1; 10.1007/s10058-009-0079-6
• Ledyard, John O. and Hanson, Robin, et el. (2009) An experimental test of combinatorial information markets; Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization; Vol. 69; No. 2; 182-189; 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.010
• Arrow, Kenneth J. and Forsythe, Robert, et el. (2008) The promise of prediction markets; Science; Vol. 320; No. 5878; 877-878; 10.1126/science.1157679
• Chen, Yiling and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2007) Second workshop on prediction markets; ISBN 978-1-59593-653-0; EC '07 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce; 361-362; 10.1145/1250910.1250965
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 133; No. 1; 441-466; 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006
• Ledyard, John O. (2007) Optimal Combinatoric Auctions with Single-Minded Bidders; ISBN 978-1-59593-653-0; Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce; 237-242; 10.1145/1250910.1250945
• Stoenescu, Tudor M. and Ledyard, John O. (2006) A pricing mechanism which implements in Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in networks; ISBN 978-1-4244-0170-3; Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; 1270-1277; 10.1109/CDC.2006.377177
• Kwasnica, Anthony M. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2005) A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions; Management Science; Vol. 51; No. 3; 419-434; 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334
• Ledyard, John O. and Lin, John C. (2003) Baby bond connect: software for combined value trading; ISBN 1-58113-679-X; EC '03 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce; 275; 10.1145/779928.779996
• Polk, Charles and Hanson, Robin, et el. (2003) The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market; ISBN 1-58113-679-X; EC '03 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce; 272-273; 10.1145/779928.779994
• Ledyard, John O. and Olson, Mark A., et el. (2002) The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services; Interfaces; Vol. 32; No. 5; 4-12; 10.1287/inte.32.5.4.30
• Bossaerts, Peter and Fine, Leslie, et el. (2002) Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms; European Economic Review; Vol. 46; No. 9; 1671-1695; 10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00240-4
• Ledyard, John O. and Olson, Mark, et el. (2002) The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services; Interfaces; Vol. 32; No. 5; 4-12; 10.1287/inte.32.5.4.30
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 83; No. 2; 153-171; 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4
• Williams, Arlington W. and Smith, Vernon L., et el. (2001) Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence; ISBN 978-3-642-62657-9; Advances in Experimental Markets; 15-32; 10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_2
• Ishikida, Takashi and Ledyard, John, et el. (2001) Experimental testbedding of a pollution trading system: Southern California's RECLAIM emissions market; ISBN 978-0-76230-702-9; Research in Experimental Economics; 185-220; 10.1016/S0193-2306%2801%2908009-7
• Bykowsky, Mark M. and Cull, Robert J., et el. (2000) Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem; Journal of Regulatory Economics; Vol. 17; No. 3; 205-228; 10.1023/A:1008122015102
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem; Econometrica; Vol. 67; No. 2; 435-448; 10.1111/1468-0262.00028
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods; Econometrica; Vol. 67; No. 2; 435-448; 10.1111/1468-0262.00028
• Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (1998) Repeated Implementation; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 83; No. 2; 308-317; 10.1006/jeth.1997.2459
• Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David, et el. (1997) Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; Vol. 6; No. 3; 639-675; 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x
• Ledyard, John O. and Noussair, Charles, et el. (1996) The allocation of a shared resource within an organization; Economic Design; Vol. 2; No. 1; 163-192; 10.1007/BF02499132
• Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John, et el. (1996) Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results; Economic Theory; Vol. 7; No. 2; 191-205; 10.1007/BF01213902
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Introduction; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 1-5; 10.1006/game.1995.1022
• Ledyard, John O. (1995) Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research; ISBN 9780691042909; The Handbook of Experimental Economics; 111-194
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Introduction [to a special issue of Games and Economic Behavior devoted to what we call experimental game theory]...; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 1-5; 10.1006/game.1995.1022
• Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly-Moore, Kristin (1994) Designing organizations for trading pollution rights; Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization; Vol. 25; No. 2; 167-196; 10.1016/0167-2681(94)90009-4
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 61; No. 2; 327-355; 10.2307/2297984
• Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David, et el. (1994) Using computerized exchange systems to solve an allocation problem in project management; Journal of Organizational Computing; Vol. 4; No. 3; 271-296; 10.1080/10919399409540228
• Ledyard, John O. (1993) The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing; Journal of Organizational Computing; Vol. 3; No. 1; 121-134; 10.1080/10919399309540197
• Easley, David and Ledyard, John O. (1993) Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions; ISBN 0201624591; The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence; 63-97
• Ledyard, John O. (1991) Market Failure; ISBN 978-0-333-55177-6; The World of Economics; 407-412; 10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_53
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (1989) Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 20; No. 1; 1-25
• Ledyard, John O. (1989) Incentive Compatibility; ISBN 978-0-333-49539-1; Allocation, Information and Markets; 141-151; 10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_15
• Ledyard, John O. (1987) The economics of the space station
• Ledyard, John O. (1986) The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 39; No. 1; 59-82; 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90020-7
• Ledyard, John O. (1981) The paradox of voting and candidate competition: A general equilibrium analysis; ISBN 9780911198591; Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics in Honor of Emmanuel T. Weiler (1914-1979); 54-80
• Groves, Theodore and Ledyard, John O. (1980) The existence of efficient and incentive compatible equilibria with public goods; Econometrica; Vol. 48; No. 6; 1487-1506; 10.2307/1912820
• Ledyard, John O. (1978) Incentive compatibility and incomplete information; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 18; 171-189; 10.1016/0022-0531(78)90047-9