Ledyard, John
- Asparouhova, Elena and Bossaerts, Peter, el al. (2020) Price Formation in Multiple, Simultaneous Continuous Double Auctions, with Implications for Asset Pricing; 10.7907/h8b1v-76536
- Ledyard, John O. (2018) Design of Tradable Permit Programs under Imprecise Measurement; 10.7907/a6fvp-ke472
- Fine, Leslie and Goeree, Jacob K., el al. (2016) ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism; 10.7907/mte8a-n4r44
- Ledyard, John O. (2009) Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs; 10.7907/74cgh-0j750
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments; 10.7907/fwfvf-9g770
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes; 10.7907/v811f-scj07
- Bossaerts, Peter and Fine, Leslie, el al. (2000) Inducing Liquidity in Thin Financial Markets through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms; 10.7907/yk4m6-yrv98
- Ledyard, John O. and Olson, Mark A., el al. (2000) The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services; 10.7907/1xbgs-71j14
- Ishikida, Takashi and Ledyard, John O., el al. (2000) Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's RECLAIM Emissions Market; 10.7907/txk4w-c9032
- DeMartini, Christine and Kwasnica, Anthony M., el al. (1999) A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions; 10.7907/wve8f-fxz97
- Bykowsky, Mark. M and Cull, Robert J., el al. (1998) Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem; 10.7907/r2944-rm514
- Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (1998) Repeated Implementation; 10.7907/b7sbx-5k980
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem; 10.7907/y319s-0vv88
- Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David, el al. (1996) The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous Items; 10.7907/6ehr5-jww49
- Dudek, R. and Kim, Taesung, el al. (1995) First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms; 10.7907/rgkfq-awr86
- Ledyard, John O. and Noussair, Charles N., el al. (1995) The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization; 10.7907/sb8p2-77f71
- Ledyard, John O. (1994) Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research; 10.7907/f3s6c-3pw50
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms; 10.7907/x8d9n-q6988
- Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly, Kristin E. (1993) Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights; 10.7907/zvw0j-4sc93
- Ledyard, John O. (1993) The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing; 10.7907/y75p1-g1790
- Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1992) Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results; 10.7907/dja9h-egh71
- Ledyard, John O. (1988) Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections; 10.7907/96gx6-bw273
- Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1988) Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources; 10.7907/mhs8g-89z20
- Ledyard, John O. (1987) Market Failure; 10.7907/rjxey-cy967
- Ledyard, John O. (1987) Incentive Compatibility; 10.7907/k0pn8-m1r25
- Ledyard, John O. (1985) The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium; 10.7907/nz1n2-wkn56
- Ledyard, John O. (1978) The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis; 10.7907/ck8tg-pc937
- Groves, Theodore and Ledyard, John O. (1978) The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods; 10.7907/8q2dx-kpv75
- Ledyard, John O. (1977) Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information; 10.7907/qk8yn-ng985